Your Status: Logged out Log in

Peirceanicism.

Member rating: No Rating | Words: | Submitted: Wed Oct 06 2004

Page Preview
Preview
Previous 1 of 5 Next

On the left is an image preview of every page of this document, and below are the first 150 words with formatting removed:

Peirceanicism Brett Manning I One characteristic objection to Peirce's theory of truth has been the charge that it implies the truth of phenomenalism. Phenomenalism, of the sort charged here, being the view that all meaningful statements can be translated into equivalent statements of the form, 'under x conditions, y sense-data will appear' (where 'x' and 'y' are descriptions mentioning only sense-data), has, as a logical consequence of this essential thesis, implications for the way we may conceive of reality: namely, it cannot acknowledge as something we may know to be real anything that cannot logically be expressed in terms of pure experiential sense-data. Thus, anything that can be held as a regularity of experience is such only insofar as it can be understood to be regular in the character of the sensible experiences it implies. No such regularity of experience, by this view, can imply the truth or reality of any underlying...

Get instant access



  • Instant, unlimited access to our documents in full
  • Swap your work for free access, or pay £4.99
  • To see the full version of this document and 150,044 others
Register Now