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A successful theory of mental representation must answer two related questions: (1) How does representation work? (2) How is misrepresentation possible?
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A successful theory of mental representation must answer two related questions: (1) How does representation work? (2) How is misrepresentation possible? These questions are related because answering (1) is a requisite for answering (2): in order to explain how it is is possible that cognitive systems produce erroneous representations (i.e. representations that do not correspond to their "proper" meanings), we must first explain how is it possible that cognitive systems produce representations at all. Moreover, in the contemporary philosophical scene, it is an additional requirement that both questions must be given naturalistic answers, i.e. answers which ultimately account for intentional phenomena in nonintentional terms. In this essay, I will briefly expound and contrast the theories advanced, in order to answer these questions, by three main contemporary philosophers of mind: Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, and Ruth Millikan. In his essay "Theory of Content I" Jerry Fodor presents the antecedents of his own theory of...
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